TAIMIE BRYANT, PHD, PROFESSOR OF LAW AT UCLA
Interviewed for The Abolitionist-Online by Claudette Vaughan

Taimie Bryant teaches Property, Nonprofit Organizations, and Animals and the Law at UCLA. Since 1995 she has been interested primarily in animal law and has taught classes on that subject. In 1998 she was lead drafter of California state legislation to shift animal sheltering from killing to saving lives. That legislative work resulted in her serving as a consultant regarding the extent to which the animal shelter legislation was a state mandate requiring reimbursement of local government. She also wrote two articles about the legislation and its aftermath. In a paper entitled “Trauma, Law and Advocacy for Animals,” Professor Bryant draws on social science and medical literatures that document the traumatic effects of witnessing violence that society has not yet recognized. She applies that literature in the context of advocates for animals, arguing that some forms of legal activism that seem ineffective for helping animals actually increase public activism and understanding of animal suffering, thereby making other forms of legal change more likely.

More recently she is also developing projects that combine social science with law with funds from a generous endowment by Bob Barker to UCLA Law School for the purpose of animal rights law teaching and scholarship.

Abolitionist: For people who aren’t familiar with your animal law work will you speak about animal law from your perspective please. What position do you take and why?

Taimie Byrant: The work I do in animal law is grounded in a belief that humans should not use animals for any purpose. As Professor Francione has eloquently argued, the legal status of animals as the property of humans lies at the root of exploitation. Accordingly, one task of animal lawyers is to explicate the many ways in which law and that legal status facilitate exploitation. It remains necessary to refute the notion that animals can be treated well within the context of property status. That is one reason much of my work concerns the ways that animals are defined in statutes and by courts. For example, under the Animal Enterprise Terrorism Act, which serves human interests in exploiting animals, an “animal” is broadly defined to include any animal so that coverage of the Act can be broad. By contrast, the term “animal” in the case of the Animal Welfare Act is very narrowly defined to exclude most of the animals exploited in research. Another task of animal lawyers is to communicate to others the complexities of legal advocacy in the context of the property status of animals. That is why I described in the article, “Trauma, Law, and Advocacy for Animals,” the complexity of making various legal advocacy decisions. Finally, in two articles I write about problems associated with utilizing the argument that animals should be treated well because they are like humans in all relevant respects. While that argument has tremendous cultural power, I don’t think it has much power when deployed in legal contexts such as reform legislation or litigation. For one thing, we end up spending inordinate time debating with exploiters whether animals really are sufficiently like humans to be treated better than they are. An example is that of chimpanzees. Since 1925 we have known that chimpanzees can think creatively and manufacture tools to accomplish specific intended goals, yet it has made no difference to exploiters or their legal entitlement to use chimpanzees. At least since Goodall’s study of chimpanzees in the wild we have known about their ability to have powerful emotions such as grief at the loss of a family member, yet it has made no difference to exploiters or their legal entitlement to use chimpanzees.

Because animals serve the function of defining what is “not-human,” the definition of “human” simply shifts whenever we learn something new about animals that crosses the previous human/animal line of demarcation. Accordingly, focusing on similarities between humans and animals and legal advocacy that attempts to directly establish the legal personhood of animals by way of standing (or even guardianship models) are fraught with difficulty. By contrast, chipping away at human entitlements to do whatever they want to with animals is just about the only thing we can do through legal reform at this time. That is why I worked on the West Hollywood ordinance that would ban the declawing of cats at the convenience of their guardians (as “owners” are called in West Hollywood). That is also why I worked on shelter reform legislation that requires animal shelters to make owner-relinquished animals available for adoption instead of killing them at the owners’ requests or because the shelter doesn’t want to clean up after them.

How, in law, will the process of refining the value of animals as direct legal subjects work in your opinion?

At the moment, I can think of three ways that law could function in the course of redefining the value of animals if there were sufficient will on the part of legislators and courts: (1) the law could be reformed to require public access to information about how animals are being abused and exploited by industrial exploiters of animals. Right now animals are themselves private property and they are held captive in private property facilities with no rights of access by any person or entity that has animals’ interests at heart. The public has little sense of how animals are treated in those facilities. Right now animals’ advocates have to break the law by breaking into such facilities just to document what is going on; (2) the law can function in small ways such as the examples I gave above of prohibiting the convenience declawing of cats and causing shelters to make owner-relinquished animals available for adoption. Another example is seeking to establish the legal requirement of non-lethal management of nuisance wildlife populations; (3) the law can guard the voices of those who protest against animal abuse. There are rampant police violations of protestors’ rights to protest, for example.

How much will the dual roles of veganism and animal law intersect in animal law facilities now and in the future?

Only fairly recently have I come to appreciate the extent to which adoption of a vegan lifestyle is central to any kind of animal advocacy, including legal advocacy, because people who enjoy animal-based products will be unlikely to be able psychologically to deal with wanting to consume animals and wanting to protect them. The dissonance associated with that will simply be too strong. One has to free one’s self of dependency on the products of animal exploitation before one can truly honestly consider, accept, and work toward the improvement of the condition of animals. Until recently I thought that people could consume animal products but still seek improved conditions for animals. The problem is, if one is “hooked” on animal products, one will consume even those produced through the most cruel of methods if products produced through more humane methods are not available. If one is “hooked” on animal products, one will always be thinking at some level, “after all, animals are for human consumption,” which will mute efforts to improve their status. Even small improvements in the condition of animals could be used to drive up the cost of consumer goods based on animals, and “advocates” who are both advocates and consumers addicted to animal-based products won’t be willing to pay the price for true improvements in animals’ conditions. One simply cannot represent the interests of those one has a vested interest in exploiting.

As far as the intersection between veganism and animal law is concerned, I think that lawyers need to be sorting out where veganism is impeded by existing laws or practices. One example is the claim that experimentation on animals is necessary to protect pharmaceutical companies from legal liability for unsafe products. The standard for epidemiological data and for experimentation on human skin samples, etc. need to be developed and then substituted for the more crude data that is used (inadequately) to protect pharmaceutical companies (first) and consumers (second). Such companies should be forced to incur the costs of genuinely effective studies rather than using such crude measures as the level at which 50% of an animal test population dies from toxicity. Another totally different example is legal work to protect vegans from workplace or other requirements that they deviate from their vegan practices (e.g., requiring vaccinations or medical tests, such as TB testing, that rely on animal products); not providing vegan meals to at schools or in hospitals). Moreover, lawyers for animals can also be involved in uncovering and legally addressing “vegan scams” such as the “faux fur” coat and sweater trim that turned out to be real animal fur. Surely there are other products sold as “vegan” that are not actually vegan.

This is not to say that one must be vegan before beginning advocacy for animals. Adopting a vegan lifestyle involves a process of transition, and one's commitment to a vegan lifestyle will grow as one deepens one's involvement in advocacy. On the other hand, pursuing advocacy without any intention of adopting a vegan lifestyle will have an adverse impact on one's advocacy, if one is committed to a vision of the world in which animals are not exploited.

Certainly not always the case, but certain vet and vet associations have previously been a thorn in the side to the animal rights movement mainly for two reasons. First, many of them won’t move off their Establishment status in deciding to side too with animal industries or animal abuse industries and second, again not always the case, but many animal activists feel let down as vets treat animals just as any other business manifesting in as larger profit margin as possible over front lining animals rights. From an animal law perspective then, veterinary experts in litigations cases have always been welfarist, treating animals as property. What would be required in law to change that? And will it be possible to change human behaviour, in law, to suit animal rights once it becomes enforced?

I agree that, in many cases, the veterinary medical establishment has been an obstacle to improvement of the status of animals. However, there are many individual veterinarians who do not agree with the position of the veterinary medical establishment (notably those who belong to the Association of Veterinarians for Animal Rights), and change in that profession must come from within. It was, after all, a veterinarian (Dr. Jennifer Conrad) who changed the law in West Hollywood as to declawing cats and changed the law in the State of California as to declawing large wild cats. As far as expert witnesses go, it seems that there will have to be more veterinarians willing to “break” from the apparent professional expectation that they not testify against another member of the profession. I believe that that number will grow, if the establishment as a whole refuses to accept the growing consensus that animals should be treated better. For instance, while there might not have been public outcry 10 years ago when thousands of unwanted chickens were killed in a wood chipper, there certainly was outcry when that happened in 2003, and the AVMA had to deal with that public outcry. There will be increasing pressure on the AVMA to respond to changing attitudes towards animals. The matter that has consistently bothered me is the extent to which animal advocates themselves seem to want to put veterinarians in the role of safeguarding animals’ interests. I occasionally see proposed legislation that would provide for veterinarians to make the judgment call about whether conditions are humane or safe for animals. Not all advocates seem to be aware that veterinarians are not always in the best position to safeguard animals’ interests. There definitely needs to be more education about that. Of course, there is a real problem if one does not put them in that role: who would be qualified to be the observer at a factory-farm, who would be qualified to evaluate whether a research protocol passes muster under the AWA, who would be qualified to make a determination of a shelter animal’s adoptability?

Does the new animal law movement need grassroots activists to proceed and prosper?

Without doubt. Law is but a time-delayed reflection of social values. Law reformers can do nothing without grassroots activism that educates and implores those who lead lives based on ignorance and indifference.

What Animal Law Courses do you teach at ULCA?

Thank goodness, an easy question for a change! In addition to the introduction to animal law course, I have taught a class on animal shelter law and two seminars in which I have asked students to write about legal projects they would engage in as lawyers to move our society in the direction of respecting animals. I have also begun teaching undergraduate courses in animal law. Last year I taught a course for the Women’s Studies Department about ecofeminism and animal law. This year I will be teaching an undergraduate course in the Law School, called “Introduction to Animal Law.”

If the new animal law movement embraces a direction that reinforces the property status of animals, how will animal rights play itself out in the law courts?

I don’t know. I choose to believe that there are legal advocates of all types actively pursuing those advocacy projects in which they believe with good faith and with diligent effort and that, therefore, eventually there will be positive change for animals. Otherwise I would be too despairing to engage in positive work of my own. The sheer amount of activity in the field is heartening because, as the numbers increase so does the diversity of viewpoints associated with the type of projects that are undertaken. We each do what we can, given our individual limitations, in the direction of what we believe in our hearts to be the path we should take. If enough people prioritize the protection of animals, we will find our way. I don’t know that anyone can predict with any certainty what the future holds. I do wish that there were more opportunities for advocates to discuss in small groups what we can and should be doing. Everyone is very eager to “get out there and do something instead of sitting around talking.” I can understand that—animals are suffering every minute of every day. On the other hand, if people could read and talk things over, we might waste less time with futile efforts or with stumbling around to find the project that could really help animals.

Looking at the broad view of animals, their lack of status in the law and the progression of the animal rights movement where do you think we need to build our strengths for further on down the track from what we have already gained?

I believe I have answered this in one way or another in previous answers. I hesitate to comment on what others differently situated than I are doing or should do. Rather, I would add here that, given where I am (a law professor) participating in the building of animal law as a respected field of scholarship, is an important step in legitimizing animal law activism. The field is currently “under-theorized.” Aside from the body of scholarship produced by Professor Francione, there is relatively little attention to the theoretical questions that should undergird our choice of advocacy projects or affirm that animal law is a rich, complex intellectual field of study that is worthy of respect. With some notable exceptions, most of the scholarship in the field is on the order of “practice guides” or how-to manuals for practitioners. As valuable as that is, it is not the type of scholarship that defines a field as intellectually rigorous. It is a stage through which many fields have passed. Feminist jurisprudence emerged only after lawyers worked diligently on advocacy projects that gave rise to bigger questions of theory. Similarly, civil rights litigation and law reform ultimately gave rise to a much broader field known as “critical race theory.” One sign of the maturation of a field is the existence of scholars who use theories from other scholarly disciplines (such as the study of rhetoric or the study of law and economics) to inform their own scholarly work. Until highly sophisticated scholarship becomes the norm in this field, animal law questions will be perceived as “easy” or “uninteresting.” The on-the-ground advocacy work will be similarly devalued; activists will be seen only as “bleeding hearts” rather than as intelligent people working on complex legal issues.

Will you talk about the productive capacity of the law as a tool for furthering animal rights please? I.e. would Common Law be suitable to grant animals their rights?

I do not believe that this question can be answered in the abstract. I believe that there will have to be a combination of legislative reform and litigation to shore up that reform and vice versa. Statutory law and common law work together in complex ways. For instance, the declaw ban in West Hollywood had to be defended by litigation against the California Veterinary Medical Association, which accused the City of unlawfully regulating the profession of veterinary medicine. If the City had not had such an able attorney to handle that litigation, the legislative reform would have been for naught.

Will the indeterminate nature of legal discourse work for or against us in interrupting and reconstituting judicial rulings?

I’m not sure what you mean by the question, but it seems that your thinking that law is indeterminate should allay your fears that recent legal work is reinforcing the role of animals as property. If law deals only in relation to narrow questions and changes nothing in large leaps, there is reason to believe that positive outcomes can emerge just as negative outcomes can emerge.

What ways so you suggest to foster an environment for people coming into the legal profession for them to embrace animal rights law?

I’ve suggested some answers to this above. I would repeat here that making animal law a respected field of study and practice is extremely useful in having those in the legal profession take an interest in the substance of the field. It would be ideal if highly accomplished attorneys would take on animal issues because they recognize those issues to be a worthy challenge for someone of their intelligence and skill.

If you are talking about people deciding to go to law school, I think that is a harder question. I think most people come to law school with the hope of making a lot of money. Sure, some people want to do some public interest work, but their threshold requirement for a “decent” wage is still so high that most will prioritize those subjects that will enable them to secure gainful employment. I regularly reflect on the discouraging fact that many students interested in animal law actually end up going into the practice of corporate law for big law firms or for big companies, thereby using their skills to further the very foundation of exploitation of animals in our society. They may do pro bono work for animals and they may tell themselves that they would never take on a client that actually results in work on behalf of an exploiting industry, but they fail to appreciate how intertwined big businesses are and how much of their life’s blood will be expended making things easier for mega-businesses that own or control businesses that abuse animals—all so that they can have what they define as a “decent” life—a financial life that far exceeds what the vast majority of Americans can or will have. It is important to note that there are fields of law that would not cause them to participate in that complex of harm—nonprofit organization law, estate planning, public defender work are but a few examples.

In Animals Unmodified you say, “ Even more challenging than deciding which affirmative rights are fundamental to each species is determining what to do about the exercise of such rights in a world that has been so badly damaged by human activity”. Would you speak more at length about this please Taimie?

What good will “rights” do, ultimately, if the world is so damaged by human activity that clean air, water, and habitat are scarce resources? For instance, what good does it do to give an animal the right to associate with members of the same species, if there is no habitat left for any of them? If there isn’t enough clean water for all the animals that currently use the oceans and rivers increasingly polluted by human activity, will we have accomplished one whole heck of a lot by giving any of those animals the “right” to use water? And what on earth would that mean? If a human wants scarce water and a fish wants some of the same scarce water and there isn’t enough water for both, who do you think will win in that contest of rights? Is there any doubt at all?

It is far easier to argue for animal “rights” when one is only talking about the right to freedom from suffering caused by humans acting on the very bodies of animals through the direct exploitation associated with factory-farming, for example. Unfortunately, if all one is talking about is freedom from suffering, then opponents can readily direct the discourse to methods of appropriate anesthesia, even though what we might want is our chosen method of freedom from suffering: cessation of exploitation. It is another thing altogether to talk about a world in which animals would actually have rights to such increasingly scarce resources as clean air, water, and habitat. If one is really talking about animal “rights,” one must grapple with these necessities of life and how animals’ interests in such resources could be protected. As long as one pursues rights directly, one will inevitably pit animals’ rights against humans’ rights with winners (humans) and losers (animals).